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EC-US  RELATIONSr  CONFLICT  AND  COHESION  IN  GLOBAL  FOREIGN  POLICY 
A  PANORAMA  OF  VIEWS 
Introduction  by  Wilhelm  Haferkamp~ 
VIce-President-of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
at the  Eighth  Annual  Conference  of  European  and  American  Journalists, 
Knokke,  6.  April  1984 I. 
It  Is  good  to  see  so  many  old  friends  gathered  here  today. 
We  all  feel  the  need  of  some  stocktaking  about  the  state of 
Transatlantic  relations: 
- Are  we  on  the  verge  of  a trade  war, 
as  s·ome  of  the  vocl ferous  headli-nes  tn  our  press 
make  us  believe? 
- Is  the  us  on  the  point  of  "gotng  Pacific" 
and  of  relegating  Its Atlantic  relationshiP  to  the  second  place? 
- Are  Atlantic  relations  undergoing  a deep  crisis? 
- What  Improvements,  If any,  could  be  suggested  as  remedies? 
I am  certain 
that after the  two  days  of  discussion  that  we  have  before  us, 
we  wtll  come  up  with  some  positive constructive  vtews 
to  these  warntng  Questions. 
II.  I suggest  that  tn  order  to  Introduce 
.  ' 
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I suggest  that  tn  order  to  Introduce  the  subJect 
we  have  a Qutck  look  at the  three  main  areas 
tn  which  conflict and  cohesion  between  us  manifest 
themselves~  t.e.: 
- trade  poltcy 
-economic  and  financial  poltcy· 
- foreign  poltcy. 
I shall  leave  aside  def~nse Issues 
as  betng  outside  our  scope. 
Let  me,  therefore,  make  a few  remarks  on  each  of  these  headings. 
Trade  ts  the  easiest subJect. 
But  It Is  the  most  talked  about. 
There  Is  an  Impressive  list of  controversial  Items 
where  we  are  at  loggerheads 
or  where  we  might  be  heading  for  conflict: 
- C A P, 
- us  Export  Administration  Act, 
- US  unitary  taxation, 
-us safeguards  measures  on  speciality steel 
and  CommunitY  reprisals, 
-half a dozen  GATT  panels  covering  EC  export  restitutions, 
EC  preferences  on  citrus,  us  manufacturing  clause,  DISC  et~. 
I could  go  on  enumerating 
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I could  go  on  enumerating  other·. examples: 
but  despite  this  Impressive  list of.  controversy  I am  not 
deeply  concerned  about  US-CommunitY  trade  relations. 
I do  not  see  any  danger  of  trade  war  ahead  of  us, 
·not  tn  the  near  future, 
nor  tn  the  medium  future. 
This  ts  not  a display  of  naive  optimism. 
Still  I owe  you  some  explanation  for  my  confidence: 
- Compared  to  our  annual  volume  of  Cvlslble>  trade 
of  some  100  b1111on  $  this  year, 
our  trade  conflicts are  minor. 
They  touch  upon  no  more  than,  let us  say,  5 % of  that  trade 
and  most  of  the  conflict  Is  betng  settled even  before  It 
materializes  and  not  a posteriori. 
-Both sides  are  fullY  conscious  of·the dangers  that  any 
trade  war  between  us  would  trigger  off. 
Our  baste  reaction,  therefore,  has  always  been 
to  avoid  an  outright  row. 
- Botn  on  the  Community  side - 4 -
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- Both,  on  the  CommunitY  side and  on  the  us  side, 
the  Administrations  In  power  are  basicallY  free  trade 
and  antlprotectlonlst. 
This  Is true, 
whatever  the.protecttonlst pressures  to  which  they 
have  been  exposed. 
I must  pay  special  tribute at this occasion  to  the  present 
US  Administration 
for·  the  determination  with  which  they  have  resisted 
protectionist pressure, 
. even  If on  occasions  they  have  not  been 
altogether successful. 
Our  basic  willingness  to  compromise  and  to  negotiate 
arrangements  was  facilitated  by  two  facts: 
· We  both  respect  the  same  International  rules  of  GATT 
which  none  of  us  wants  to  throw  over  board. 
• Dialogue  between  the  US  and  the  CommunitY  takes  place 
at the  Community  level: 
one  European  Interlocutor,  the  EC  Commission, 
negotiating  with  one  us  Interlocutor, 
the  US  government. 
This  ts  an  important  point. 
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This  Is  an  importan·t.Point •  . . 
It means  that  resolution· of  conflict  Is  taking  Place 
between  two  partners  of  equal  responsibility. 
Economic  and  financial  policy  Is  an  area  less  easy  to  cope  with. 
·BasicallY  we  have  to  deal  with  one  fundamental  problem: 
the  lnfluence·of  the  high  US-Interest  rates  on  our  economies. 
And  we  have  to-do-with  one  less  fundamental, 
even  though  constant  source  of  Irritation,  · 
the  wild  fluctuations  of· the  us$  compared  to  other  currencies. 
I do  not  want  to  discuss  the  respective  merits  or  shortcomings 
of  us  or  EC  economic  and  financial  policies. 
We  have  followed  different  paths  at different  times 
and  with  different  results. 
But,  our  problems  In  the  fields  of  economic  and  financial  policies 
are  as  much  problems  of  perception  or  of  misconception 
as  they  are  problems  of  substance. 
Essentially,  we  have  to  adress 
the  phenomenon  of  the  US  economy  as  the  world's  dominant  economy 
and  of  the  policy  responsibilities  which  stem  from  this 
dominant  role. 
Economic  policY  priorities 
!  ... ·,.'.'  . 
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Economic  pollcy·prlorltles  ar~"-everywhere fixed  on  the  basis  of 
national  ~onslderatlons~ 
be  they  political  or  economic. 
No  economic  policy-maker  likes  to  complicate  hls  model 
by  Inserting  third country  Interests. 
This  Is  fine 
as  long  as  economic  policy  decisions  have  none  or  only  limited 
effects  on  the  outside  world. 
Nobody  cares 
whether  Sweden  or  Ireland  devaluate  or  run  an  excessive 
budget  deficit~ 
but  everybody  cares 
about  what  sort of  economic  POlley  the  us  Administration 
tries to  conduct. 
Their  decisions  matter~ 
because  everyone  on  the  globe  will  feel  either  Pinched 
or  relieved  by  US  economic  policy  decisions. 
Indeed~  US  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  has  an  overwhelming  Influence 
on  all  national  economies~ 
whatever  the  US  Intentions. 
It  ts  this situation - 7  -
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It  Is  this  Sl tuatlon  \ ·. 
which  renders  any  dialogue  between  us  so  difficult. 
It becomes·even  more  difficult by  the  fact 
that  Europeans  often  had  the  feeling  of  speaking  against 
stone  walls, 
when  they  tried  to  obtain  a dt'fferent  policy  mix 
<whether  a  lower  budget  deficit 
or  a little bit more  of  stabilizing  Intervention 
.  In  the  exchange  markets>.  · 
What  then  Is  wrong  and  what  should  be  done? 
t  think  we  would  be  better off 
If we  had  something  like  an  realistic  policy  dialogue 
between  the  EC  and  the  US  on  Questions  of  economic  and 
financial  policy. 
I say  so 
not  tn.order  to  create a new  transatlantic Institution. 
But  I think 
we  need  a substantive,  even  though  Informal  dialogue, 
something  of  the  type  that  we  have  successfullY set· 
In  the  trade  field. 
Of  course,  such  a policY  dialogue - 8  -
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Of  course,  such  a policy  dlaldQue  on  economic  POlley  ls  much  more 
difficult to  organize  than  ln  the  trade.flelds: 
- Flrst., 
the  EC  as  such  has  only  llmlted  responstblltty 
for  economic,  monetary  and  fiscal  policy. 
- Secondly, 
Still, 
the  Issues  are  poltttcally much  more  sensitive 
than  trade  Issues. 
~ believe  we  should  gtve  this  idea  a try. 
After  alL 
we  have  our  own  Intra-European  economic  and  monetary  policy 
machinery 
<economic  policy  committee, 
committee  of  central  bank  governors, 
foretgn  exchange  committee>. 
Why  then  not  organize,. 
let us  say  once  a quarter, 
one-day  Informal  meetings  between  the  few  responsible  top  officials 
on  the  us  and  the  EC  stde 
on  monetary,  budgetary,  exchange  POlley  Issues. 
Such  meetings  should  allow 
·------- .  -··-··- .. ------- ------------
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Such  meetings  should  allow  \  .  .  . 
- to  compare  notes~ 
- to  discover  In  time  potential  areas  of  conflict 
-and to  allow  for  Informal  advice  being  administered 
on  the  other  side. 
In  the  field of  foreign  policY  we  encounter  fundamentally  the 
same  pattern. 
On  one  side~ 
a giant  us  that  takes  action~ 
hardly  concerned  by  whatever  questions  or  doubts  Europeans 
might  have 
and  wlth  little or  no  reflex  of  consultation. 
On  the  other  side~ 
a praiseworthy  but  Inadequate  EC  effort of  foreign  poltcy 
coordination~ 
but  nothing  that  resembles  a Community  foreign  policy. 
Thus~. 
there  1s  the  same  pattern of  asymmetry 
between  a "strong"  US  acting  ln  unity 
and  an  EC  that  speaks  and  acts  sometimes  1n  dispersion. 
Add  to  the  structural  problem: 
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Add  t6 the  structural  problem~~\ 
- Certain  difficulties of  psychology  and  perception~ 
- obJecttve divergencies  on  substance. 
Our  psychological  problems  can  be  put  In  very  simple  terms: 
Europeans 
only  have  the  possibilitY  to  criticize us  foreign  policY~ 
but  ar~ unable  to  reallY  Influence  itJ 
and  the  more  they  realize their·own  lack  of  tnluence 
the  more  they  tend  to  merely  criticize. 
In  addition~  Europeans 
still tend  to  consider  themselves  as  the  more  experienced 
foreign  policy-makers 
and  to  have  little trust  in  the  wisdom  of  US  foreign  POlley,  .  . 
Europeans.-
would  probably  more  easily  submtt  themselves  to  US  foreign 
policy~ 
as  they  have  done  until  the  mtd  stxttes~ 
If they  had  full  confidence 
that  US  foreign  policy  would  always  be  also  tn  the 
best  European  Interest. 
On  substance  Europeans  tend  to  disagree - 11  -
On  substance  Europea~s tend  to~dlsagree with  the  us  on  three 
maJor  lssuesa 
- Eastwwest-relatlons 
Europeans  have  mlsglvlngs 
about  what  they  perceive  as  a US  line bf  confrontation 
and  striving for  superiority. 
Europe  has  doubts 
about  the  way  ln  which  this  Is  being  done. 
Europe  wants  to  preserve· the  bastes  of  the  detente  poltcy, 
even  lf lt views  Soviet  mllltary  build-up  wtth  a great 
deal  of  concern. 
- Middle  East 
Sharing  the  fu~damental goal  of  permanent  peace  tn  the  Middle-
East, 
Europeans  have  doubts  on  the  way  ln  which  the  US  has 
approached  the  problem. 
- Central  America 
Europe  does  not  believe  In  mlli~ary solutions. 
It does  not  view  Central  America  as  an  east/west  problem, 
but  rather  as  ~n economic  and  social  Issue. 
Europeans  think  the  US  concerns ---------------
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Europeans  thln~the US  concerns  about  the  strategic 
role  of  small  contrles  like  Granada~  Nicaragua  or  Cuba 
exaggerated. 
I do  not  intend 
to  go  into  depth  of  any  spec1f1c  foreign  policy  Issues. 
FundamentallY 
we  have  to  ·do  with  a general  uneasiness  about  the  way 
1n  which  us  foreign  POlley  1s  being  defined  and  Implemented. 
We  have  to  do 
as  much  with  a problem  of  methods  and  understanding 
as  with  spec1f1c  Issues. 
What  then  should  be  done 
to  address  that  situation? 
First of  all~  we  have  to  realize, 
that  the  EC~ as  a· power  to  Influence  events~  1s  a regional 
phenomenon. 
We  have  Interests  worldwide. 
We  trade  and  give  aid  around  the  globe. 
--- ·------- -=_,,::..,.._ ~== 
·But  our  ab111ty  to  exert  active  influence 
1n  our  own  right  1s  probably  11m1ted. 
Our  Interests are  concentrated 
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Our  Interests are  concentrate~.on 
Eastern  Europe., 
the  Atlantic  area., 
the  Mediterranean 
and  Africa. 
And  lt is  here 
.. 
that  Europe  should  take  more  responsibilitY  than  in  the  past., 
and  that  the .. us  should  allow  or  rather  push  the  Community 
to  play  a more  responsible  part. 
Secondly,  we  must  learn 
not  always  to  be  on  the  same  "wave  length". 
It  is  normal, 
that  there  is  not  always  and  on  all  Issues  full  agreement 
among  us. 
We  look  at the  world  from  dl fferent  .view  points. 
Thirdly, 
as  long  as  Europe  does  not  adopt  foreign  policy  positions 
of  its own., 
as  long  as  European  political  cooperation  has  not  been 
firmly  established., 
it will  be  difficult to  have  a fruitful  consultation  process. 
Still,  I think .. 
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Stll L  I think  the  US  might  be\ well  advised 
If It took  the  lntttattve of  tmprovlng  foreign  poltcy 
consultations  with  the  EC. 
Nothing  could  be  more  helpful  to  producing  a greater  unlty  of  views~ 
first among  the  Europeans  themselves~ 
secondlY  across  the  Atlantic 
tf Europeans  were  forced  Into  an  almost  permanent 
consultation  process  on  maJor  foreign  policy  Issues 
in  which  Europe  has  a stake. 
This  must  be  more  than  mere  Information. 
It must  become  a process  of  give  and  take. 
And  Europe  must  take  Its  responstbtlltes. 
But  as  long  as  the  consultation  process  ts  Inadequate 
and  takes  place  between  the  us  and  10  tndtvldual  Member  States~ 
we  should  not  be  surprised 
that there  ls  so  much  frustration 
and  lack  Of  support  Of  US  foreign  POlley. 
III.  In  conclusion~ 
·----·..,.- .. ____  __,. In  conclusion~  I believe 
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that  the  state of  relations  between  us  Is  obJectively  better 
than  what  the  media  try  to  make  us  believe. 
If  relations  between  all countries  were  as  good  as  between  the  us 
and  the  CommunitY~  . 
we  would  have  reason  to  reJoice. 
Stlll~  we  should  not  overlook  the  dangers 
of  drifting  apart~ 
of  misunderstandings 
and  of  undermining  the  foundations  of  the  Atlantic  Alliance. 
The  problems  we  have  to  deal  wlth  are  threefold: 
First~  they  are  problems  of  substance~ 
because  we  have  sometimes  different  views 
of  what  the  world  should  be.  · 
I think  we  have  to  llve  wlth  these. 
But  we  should  try  to  mlntmlze.frlctlons 
;by  setting  up  adequate  machinery  for  preventing 
.and  solving  conflicts  between  us. 
SecondlY  psychological  problems. ---------------------
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SecondlY  psychological  problem~··. 
Much  of  our  uneasiness  is  due 
to  different  perception, 
to  lack  of  Information  and  consultation. 
Policy  processes  are,  as  we  know, 
not  only  a matter  of  logical  cold  Interests, 
but  also  of  psychology. 
We  have  to  keep  this  in  mind. 
A permanent  dialogue  may  help 
to  reduce  frictions springing  from  this  source . 
... 
ThirdlY  Institutional  problems.· 
I am  convinced  that  our  relations  would  be  easter 
If they  were  better balanced, 
tf .the  US  could  address  Europe  as  one  single  responsible  unit. 
30  years  ago 
Our  experience  In  the  trade  field  appears  to  me 
convincing  in  thfs  respect. 
the  US  have  pushed  Europeans  Into  economic  integration. 
They  have  lent 
___  _:.,;..;_. ________ ----·-··-------.· 
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They  have  lent  their active support  to  the  experience  of  the  EEC. 
Today  Europe  Is  feeling  once  again 
Its own  InadeQuacy, 
Its Institutional  weeknesses. 
Many  people  feel  the  need 
to  reach  for  a new  stage  of  European  - political  - Integration. 
How  could  we  possibly  dream  of  European  securitY  and· foreign  Polley 
without  a much  more  solid political  Infrastructure, 
without  a European  Union? 
Maybe  we  should  once  again  be  pushed  Into  this  new  stage  of  European 
Integration  from  outside. 
Of  course, 
the  essential  Job  will  still have  to  be  done  bY  Europeans 
themselves1 
either  we  have  the  political  will  to  play  the  role 
that  we  think  we  should  ~lay on  the  basts  of  our 
economic,  technological  and  human  potential 
or  we  shall  soon  or  later have  to  restgn  ourselves 
to  remain  no  more  than  a few  wealthy  small  nations 
wtth  little say  In  world  affairs. 
I for  my  part 
·- --------·----=·  ===-' 
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I for  my  part  hope 
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that  Europe  will  still have  the  courage  to  take  up  the  challenge . 
. 
But  whatever  the  outcome, 
there  Is  no  option  for  the  Community, 
but  on  the  side  with  the  United  States. 
After  all,  fundamentallY  we  share 
common  ldeal·s  and  values, 
common  policy  goals 
and  very  largely  common  Interests. 
The  only  question  Is 
whether  and  to  what  extent  a more  united  Europe  will  have 
a more  decisive  Influence  on  policies 
- security,  foreign,  economic  -
within  the  Atlantic  Alliance. 
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